A surprising contact on LinkedIn. A proposal of work from a headhunter, probably a young woman, operating from China. The chance to make around £20,000 on the side preparing a small number of political reports for a Chinese company containing confidential or privileged insights. Payment in digital currency or cash preferred.
It may seem obvious, in this scenario, that an element about this method would be suspicious. However, China’s powerful Ministry of State Security continues to view it worthwhile to deploy recruitment consultants to try it – prompting MI5 to warn repeatedly about their operations online.
Massive Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
In 2023, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum stated operatives from China were approaching UK citizens on LinkedIn on an extraordinary level, at a frequency of 10,000 over the previous two and a half years, attempting to obtain political, commercial, military and technological secrets. But a fresh initiative targeting politicians and parliament has prompted the intelligence service to act again.
An espionage alert was issued on this week via the offices of the Commons speaker and his Lords equivalent: a single slide after the repeated efforts of Shirly Shen and other operatives to contact Members of Parliament, peers, their assistants, economic experts, research organizations – anyone who might become a source.
Intelligence Approach and Legal Changes
In the curious style of UK security services, there was no publication of the security advice from MI5 or the interior ministry. Yet the service knew its briefing note would become public once it was sent electronically out to Westminster. Sharing it in the press helps the general population better identify communications with a deceptive intent.
The alert has the effect of uncovering additional details from within parliament, although that is not MI5’s main objective. The service wants people in public life to understand that simply because exchanges on LinkedIn are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are completely safe.
Additionally, the internal security service understood to have been responding to any specific incident in parliament, although the burst of activity does come after the embarrassing failure of the legal case of a ex-assistant an individual and his associate Christopher Berry on a technicality in recent months.
Both individuals had been charged of spying for China – a charge they rejected – but failure to complete a prosecution under the since replaced previous legislation resulted in warnings that British democracy had been insufficiently defended.
Updated Legislation and Beijing's Strategic Interests
Legislation has since been updated, and the MI5 slide contains a reminder of its successor: “Those engaging in espionage activity risk significant criminal penalties under the new security law.” This constitutes a criminal offense if a person engages in conduct that could potentially “materially assist a overseas spy agency”.
A natural inquiry, though, is what China has to gain. An elected representative who is not a government minister will have limited access of classified material, and an associate of theirs even less. Yet the Chinese government is particularly focused in the legislative body: for a time, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s approach to China on issues such as the telecom firm or the Uyghur repression or alleged atrocities was being driven by MPs.
Cultural Differences and Persistent Digital Risks
To a degree there are cultural differences too. Autocratic regimes like Beijing's export information gathering methods and the size of its spy network is vast, engaging three hundred thousand people. A former US official, a US national cyber director under the US administration, commented it was sometimes estimated that “the Chinese have more English speakers engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have English speakers”.
The Chinese government is prepared to develop contacts over the long term and at times even the intelligence services have found it difficult to differentiate legitimate relationships and espionage. “Beijing has a minimal requirement for which details is deemed to be useful,” security minister Dan Jarvis told MPs on this week, but a rapid shift in the government situation may mean someone rapidly marginal becomes important.
Another way to think about the continuous efforts at secret information gathering is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between Beijing and the Western nations at a threshold under the level of outright war. China has stepped up its hacking efforts, with the one campaign infiltration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon breach of millions connected equipment.
Beijing is involved in persistent attempts to identify secret informants on British democracy online because it seeks to be challenging, to demonstrate power and because it has the capability.